‘Owning’ Unborn Children: Their Moral Status and Rights – A Critique of the Bodily Autonomy Argument

Abstract

The bodily autonomy argument is central in the debate on abortion and is used within the areas of law, medicine, and philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to highlight that even upon conceding that women have the right to bodily autonomy, this right is not absolute. Though this caveat is not unorthodox in and of itself, even if, for the sake of argument, unborn children are viewed as ‘property’ and are ‘owned’ by the mother (‘Premise’), both concepts being defined within the framework of Foetal Bundle Theory, it does not follow that pregnant women can treat the foetus however they desire. Therefore, the bodily autonomy argument cannot be used to justify a termination. This paper further argues that even if the truth of this Premise is granted, it does not nullify an unborn child’s moral status or rights. Therefore, their moral status and rights should be taken into consideration when evaluating the justification of a termination. This paper is both topical and timely given the recent overturning of Roe v Wade (1973).